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INTRODUCTION

On June 9, 2009, the European Court of Human Rights delivered its
judgment in the case of Opuz v. Turkey.' In Opuz, the applicant claimed
that the Turkish government violated the European Convention on Human
Rights by failing to adequately protect her and her mother from the
domestic violence abuse-and eventually murder-perpetrated by the
applicant's former husband.2 In particular, the applicant claimed violations
of her right to life;3 her right to be free from torture, inhuman and
degrading treatment and punishment; her right to obtain an effective
remedy before a national authority; 5 and her right to be free from gender
discrimination. 6 In its landmark decision, the European Court of Human
Rights did indeed find that the Turkish government had violated the right to
life with respect to the killing of the applicant's mother committed by the
applicant's former husband. Moreover, the European Court of Human

Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law.
1. Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 118-20 (2009), available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-92945.
2. Id.
3. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 005, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European
Convention] (entered into force on Sept. 3, 1953).
4. See id. art. 3.
5. See id. art. 13.
6. See id art. 14.
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Rights found that the Turkish authorities had violated the applicant's right
to be free from torture by failing to protect her from domestic violence.
Finally, it found that the Turkish government had also violated the
applicant's right of non-discrimination based on sex, thereby significantly
recognizing domestic violence as a form of gender discrimination that
amounts to state responsibility.
Similarly, in the recent landmark decision in Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales)

v. United States, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) held the United States accountable for failing to exercise due
diligence to protect the applicant and her daughters from repetitive acts of
domestic violence as well as for failing to enforce a mandatory protective
order against the applicant's former husband which eventually led to the
murder of the applicant's daughters.8 Moreover, the IACHR recommended
that the United States implement substantive changes to domestic violence
law and policy.9 In particular, the Commission's recommendations
included, inter alia, that: the state should be responsible for conducting a
proper investigation into the systemic failures that led to the underenforcement of the applicant's protection order; the mandatory character of
protection orders and other precautionary measures meant to protect
women from imminent acts of violence should be legislatively reinforced;
and, finally, effective implementation mechanisms should be developed.'o
Traditionally, international law understood the concept of state
accountability only in the context of human rights violations imputed to the
government or any of its agents." Because domestic violence is comprised
of acts committed by private individuals, these crimes have long been
deemed to fall outside the scope of state accountability.1 2 More recently,
7. See Opuz, App. No. 33401/02, T 200 (holding that, regardless of the
government's intention, Turkey is responsible for discrimination against women by
failing to protect against gender-based violence).
8. Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
80/11,

170, 177, 199 (2011).

9. See id. 201(4)-(7) (recommending reformation of existing laws regarding
enforcement of protection orders, children protection policies, domestic violence, and
other protocols affecting the family).
10. Seeid. 201(2),(4).

11. See Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and
Consequences, Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender
Perspective: Violence Against Women-The Due Diligence Standardas a Tool for the
Elimination of Violence Against Women, Comm'n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc.

E/CN.4/2006/61,
57 (Jan. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur] (noting that the
failure of international law to address the needs of women is due more to a narrow
interpretation of rights within the international legal order than to human rights
discourse itself); see also Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Beasley, Domestic
Violence as a Human Rights Issue, 15 HUM. RTs. Q. 36, 41 (1993).
59-60 (criticizing the "public/private
12. See Special Rapporteur, supra note 11,
dichotomy in international law" as being a primary barrier to the protection of women's

rights and for normalizing domestic violence).
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however, the concept of state accountability has been expanded to include
not only state actions, but also-and more importantly-state omissions
and failures to take appropriate steps to protect women from domestic
violence.13 Therefore, in addition to preventing through its own agents the
commission of violence against women, the states are obligated to prevent
acts of violence against women committed by private individuals. A state
conforms to this obligation by duly investigating relevant allegations,
prosecuting perpetrators, and providing adequate remedies for victims.
This Article analyzes judicial developments regarding a state's
responsibility to prevent domestic violence focusing on recent decisions by
international human rights judicial institutions. In particular, the Article
examines the above-mentioned 2009 decision in Opuz v. Turkey, as well as
earlier case law in the European Court of Human Rights.14 Then, the
article concludes by addressing the jurisprudence of the IACHR, including
Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States and the legislative and policy

recommendations the Commission made regarding domestic violence."
By examining these decisions and the implications they have for the
understanding of domestic violence under international law, this Article
explains the development of a new judicial trend towards states' positive
obligation to protect victims of domestic abuse.' 6 This Article also
investigates the standard of due diligence for state liability," and suggests
universal criteria according to which international law should apply to
domestic violence as a human rights violation.' 8
I. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

A recent study by the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that
domestic violence is the most prevalent-yet relatively hidden and
ignored-form of violence in women's lives.19 Although comprehensive
statistics are hard to come by, the proportion of women in the countries
surveyed who are victims of domestic violence ranged from 15% to 71%,
with most countries falling between 29% and 62%.20 Women in Japan
13. See id. 1 61 (noting that the due diligence standard has held States responsible
for failures to respond to the problem of domestic violence); see also id.
57
(observing that the work done by women's rights activists has paved the way in
holding States responsible for violence against women by private actors).
14. See infra pp. 432-33.
15. See infra pp. 434-35.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra pp. 435-36.
19. See generally WORLD HEALTH ORG., MULTI-COUNTRY STUDY ON WOMEN'S
HEALTH AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (2005).
20. Id. at 5.
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were the least likely to have experienced intimate partner abuse, while the
highest rate of violence was reported by women living in rural parts of
Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Peru, and Tanzania. 2 1 Despite the systematic nature
and rampant occurrence of domestic violence that affects women
worldwide, it was only recently-and after considerable efforts-that the
international community came to focus on human rights for women,
classifying domestic abuse as a pervasive and specific form of violence that
constitutes a per se human rights violation.22
The broad principle of non-discrimination was first generally recognized
in the Charter of the United Nations adopted on June 26, 1945, providing
for "the equal rights of men and women,"2 3 and including the promotion
and encouragement of respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without any distinction based on sex as a purpose of the
United Nations itself.24 Along the same lines, in 1948, the General
Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which provided that all human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights, without any distinctions based on gender.25
In 1979, following such general acknowledgment of the intrinsic value
of any individual life, as well as the commitment to equal treatment and
non-discrimination on the basis of sex, the United Nations General
Assembly unanimously adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which was the first
comprehensive international instrument solely addressing gender equality
and acknowledging women as victims of unique human rights violations.26
2 1. Id

22. See Special Rapporteur, supra note 11, 58 (noting the diversity of challenges
to recognizing violence against women as a human rights issue, including the
dichotomy between the public and private spheres and the resurgence of identity
politics based on cultural specificity that challenges State authority); see also
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women, 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/38,
123 (1993) [hereinafter General Recommendation 19] (stating that domestic violence
is one of the most insidious forms of violence against women and is prevalent
throughout all societies); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, pmbl., Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter
CEDAW] (recognizing that violence against women is a human rights issue that
various international instruments have failed to adequately address); Thomas &
Beasley, supra note 11, at 57-5 8 (discussing various impediments to addressing human
rights for women, including inadequate documentation and statistical information, lack
of cooperation between women's rights and human rights groups, and various
methodological limitations, such as demonstrating systematic failures by States and
addressing the underlying causes of domestic violence).
23. U.N. Charter pmbl.
24. Id. art. 1, T 3; see also id. art. 13, T 1(b); id. art. 55; id. art. 76.
25. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 1-2, G.A. Res. 217(III)A, U.N.

Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
26. See generally CEDAW, supra note 22, pmbl. (listing numerous concerns and
possible consequences of gender discrimination for women and society as a whole).
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CEDAW did not explicitly address sexual violence, but rather condemned
any form of discrimination against women, meaning any "distinction,

exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise
by women ... of human rights and fundamental freedoms." 27
Signatory countries, hereinafter addressed as State Parties, committed
themselves to condemn and eradicate discrimination against women in all
of its forms by incorporating the principle of gender equality in their legal
systems, and by adopting appropriate measures to modify or abolish
existing laws, customs, and socio-cultural patterns which are based on the
idea of inferiority or superiority or stereotypical gender roles of either
sex. 2 8 Moreover, State Parties are committed to establishing judicial and
other public institutions aimed at ensuring the effective protection of
women against discrimination, and at eradicating any gender-based
discriminatory action committed by persons or organizations. 29
In order to achieve the aforementioned goals, Article 17 of CEDAW
established a Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW Committee), which operates as a supervisory body
responsible for monitoring-through review of their periodic reportsState Parties' efforts and progress towards meeting their commitments
under CEDAW.3 0 Comprised of independent experts elected by the State
Parties on the basis of their high moral standing and specific competence in
women's rights and gender equality,3 1 the CEDAW Committee has the task
of converting the process of reviewing reports submitted by State Parties
into a constructive dialogue on relevant women's issues, as well as drafting
general recommendations.
The adoption of general recommendations by the CEDAW Committee
represents an indispensable tool for interpreting the treaty regarding issues
lying outside the gender discrimination framework, as well as for ensuring
the correct application of the normative text to grave violations of women's
rights. Although these general recommendations are not legally binding,
they help clarify State Parties' obligations, which are not explicitly
mentioned or adequately explained in the CEDAW's text. In the case of
violence against women, for instance, the lack of reference thereof in the
treaty was subsequently supplemented by two general recommendations.
In particular, General Recommendation No. 12, issued by the CEDAW
27. Id. arts. 1-2.
28. See id. arts. 2, 5 (describing goals and means of eliminating discrimination
within society).

29. See id art. 2.
30. See id. arts. 17-21.
31. See id.art. 17.
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Committee in 1989, acknowledged State Parties' obligation to protect
women against violence of any kind occurring within the family or in any
other area of social life.32 It also recommended State Parties include in
their periodic reports any legislation in force to protect women from all
kinds of violence and any other measures adopted to eradicate genderGeneral
based violence as well as relevant statistical data.3 3
Recommendation No. 19, adopted in January 1992, further addressed the
issue, clarifying that "[g]ender-based violence is a form of discrimination
that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy equal rights and freedoms
to those of men." 34 Indeed, it provided that the broad definition of
discrimination against women also include any practice of gender-based
violence-"that is, violence directed against a woman because she is a
General
woman" or that affects women disproportionately.3 s
Recommendation No. 19 also stressed that cultural norms that regard
women as inferior to men perpetuate a structure of subordination and
generate patterns of gender-based violence in the society, which ultimately
impair or nullify the women's enjoyment of human rights and fundamental
freedoms.36
Furthermore, the text of General Recommendation No. 19 affirmed that
CEDAW applies to acts of violence against women committed by public
However, it clarified that, under the treaty, gender
authorities.
discrimination does not only encompass actions perpetrated by state agents,
but, according to general international law, governments may also be
responsible for private acts if they fail to exercise due diligence to prevent
violations of women's rights or to adequately investigate and punish acts of
violence, and to provide compensation for the victims. 38 Finally, General
Recommendation No. 19 recognized that domestic violence is one of the
most insidious forms of gender-based violence, and that is prevalent in all
societies.3 9 Indeed, "[w]ithin family relationships women of all ages are
subjected to violence of all kinds, including battering, rape, other forms of
sexual assault, mental and other forms of violence, which are perpetuated

32. See Comm'n on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation No. 12: Violence Against Women, 8th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/44/38,
pmbl. (1989) [hereinafter General Recommendation 12] (charging the State Parties to
protect against violence in the family and work life).
33. See id. TT 1-4 (listing the recommendations to the State Parties from the
CEDAW Committee).
34. General Recommendation 19, supra note 22, 1.
35. Id. T 6.
36. See id. 7, 11.
37. Id. 8.
38. Id. 9.
39. Id. 23.
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by traditional attitudes ... [t]hese forms of violence put women's health at
risk and impair their ability to participate in family life and public life on a
basis of equality."40
The provisions included in General Recommendation No. 19 became the
basis for the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women
(U.N. Declaration)-the first specific international instrument addressing
gender-based violence, which was adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1993.41 The U.N. Declaration defined "violence against
women" as including "any act of gender-based violence which results in, or
is likely to result in, physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to
women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life."4 2 According to the
U.N. Declaration, violence against women includes, inter alia, sexual,
physical or mental abuse of women occurring in the family, including
battery, the sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowryrelated violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation, and other
traditional practices harmful to women. 4 3
Furthermore, the U.N. Declaration provides that State Parties should
denounce violence against women and adopt all appropriate means to
eradicate practices of gender-based violence, including "exercise[ing] due
diligence to prevent, investigate, and ... punish acts of violence against
women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private
Finally, the UN Declaration encourages State Parties to
persons.'"
promote research and carry out data collection and compilation of statistics
concerning domestic abuse and the prevalence of different forms of
violence against women.45
Following the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
on November 4, 1950, the governments of the European countries adopted
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention), which took force on September 3,
40. Id.

41. Compare U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women
G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/38, art. 1 (1993)
[hereinafter U.N. Declaration] (importing the term "gender-based violence" to describe
violence against women that results in the deprivation of liberty), with CEDAW, supra
note 22, 1 (introducing the term "gender-based violence" to describe violence against
women that inhibits women's enjoyment of rights and freedoms).
42. U.N. Declaration, supra note 41, art. 1.

43. See id. art. 2 (including gender based abuses such as "battering, sexual abuse of
female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital
mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and
violence related to exploitation").
44. See id. art. 4.
45. See id. art. 4(k).
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1953.46 Article 14 of the European Convention sets forth that States must
secure the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms without any form
of gender discrimination.47 The European Convention also provides for the
universal right to marry and establish a family, 48 as well as the right to
respect for one's private and family life, home, and correspondence without
any interference by a public authority except for reasons of national
security, public safety, or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 4 9 Furthermore,
Protocol No. 7 to the European Convention recognizes spouses' equality of
rights and responsibilities, both between themselves and in their relations
with their children.5 0
In 1985, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe passed
Recommendation No. R(85)4 on Violence in the Family, encouraging
member states to adopt preventive measures against domestic abuse and
The passage of
clarifying the powers of state intervention."
by
Recommendation
in
1990
R(85)4
was
followed
Recommendation No.
No. R(90)2, providing specific social measures concerning violence within
the family.52 Finally, in 2002, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe acknowledged that domestic abuse is the most common form of
violence against women in all European countries, and that it is not limited
to any particular social group or class.53 It also stressed that domestic
violence is the major cause of death and invalidity for women between 16
and 44 years of age-thus amounting to a violation of human rights, and a

46. See European Convention, supra note 3, pmbl.
47. Id. art. 14.
48. Id. art. 12.
1-2 (listing exceptions to the right to be free from government
49. See id. art. 8,
interference as including considerations of national security, public safety, the
economic well-being of the country, the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection
of health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others).
50. Id. art. 5.
51. See Recommendation No. R(85)4 of the Committee of Ministers to Member
States on Violence in the Family (1985) (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on
Mar. 26, 1985, at the 382nd meeting of the Ministers' Deputies).
52. See generally Recommendation No. R(90)2 of the Committee of Ministers to
Member States on Violence in the Family (1990) (adopted by the Committee of
Ministers on Jan. 15, 1990, at the 432nd meeting of the Ministers' Deputies)
(recommending specific policy changes that provide structural equity to men and
women as equals in family matters, including education classes on gender equity and
affirmative attempts to prevent situations where women may be exploited or subjects of
abuse in domestic situations).
53. See Recommendation 1582 of the Parliamentary Assembly on Domestic
Violence Against Women, 1 (2007) (adopted by the Assembly on Sept. 27, 2002, at
the 32nd sitting).
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Furthermore, the recommendation
political and public problem.54
recognized that acts of domestic violence are criminal acts, and thus,
member states have an obligation to prevent, investigate, and punish them,
as well as to provide adequate protection to the victims.55
Also in 2002, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
produced another important initiative in the area, the Recommendation
The
Rec(2002)5 on the Protection of Women Against Violence. 6
recommendation affirms that member states have an obligation to exercise
due diligence to prevent, investigate, and punish acts of violence against
women-whether those acts are perpetrated by public authorities or private
persons-and to provide protection to victims. 57 Moreover, it presents a
detailed list of practical measures addressing violence against women,
including, inter alia, services and legal remedies for victims of domestic
violence, and in particular immigrant women; training programs for police,
judicial, medical, and counseling personnel; and, finally, appropriate
compensation for any pecuniary, physical, psychological, moral, and social
damage suffered by domestic violence victims.58
In 2004, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe further
confirmed that member states have an obligation under international law to
exercise due diligence in taking effective steps to eradicate violence against
women both in the public and private domains, as well as to protect
victims.59 Under Recommendation 1681, member states themselves should
be held accountable for acts of violence if they fail to take effective
measures to prevent acts of violence and punish those who perpetrate them,
as well as to protect the survivors.6 o Again in 2006, under Resolution 1512,
the various European Parliaments united to combat domestic violence
against women through a cooperative approach, which included, inter alia,
appropriate legislative and budgetary measures. 6 ' Further, Resolution 1512
restates that domestic violence is a serious violation of human rights, which
54. See id. 2.
55. See id. 4.

56. See generally Recommendation R(02)5 of the Committee of Ministers to
Member States on The Protection of Women Against Violence (2002) (adopted by the
Committee of Ministers on April 30, 2002, at the 794th meeting of the Ministers'
Deputies).
57. See id.

II.

8-11, 23-33, 36-40.
58. See id. app.,
59. See Recommendation 1681 of the Parliamentary Assembly on the Campaign to

Combat Domestic Violence Against Women in Europe,
Assembly on Oct. 8, 2004, at the 32nd sitting).

2 (2004) (adopted by the

60. Id
61. See Resolution 1512 of the Parliamentary Assembly on Parliaments United in
Combating Domestic Violence Against Women,
4-6 (2006) (adopted by the
Assembly on June 28, 2006, at the 20th sitting).
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affects every single Council of Europe member state beyond any
geographical boundaries, age limit, race, or social background.6 2
Lastly, this was followed by Recommendation 1759, which called on the
Committee of Ministers to make the fight against domestic violence a
priority activity in 2006-2008, and to allocate the necessary budgetary
resources towards that goal by financing specific national and regional
activities at the intergovernmental, parliamentary, local, and regional
levels.63
Despite the many legal instruments produced by the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Union has

not yet issued a binding document on the protection of women against
gender-based violence. 64 However, in 2009, the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe announced the preparation of a European convention on
action against violence against women, which seeks to "create an
international, legally binding framework for national legislation and
policies based on the trademark Council of Europe approach-protect,
prevent and prosecute."6 5
As for the Inter-American System, in 1994 the Organization of American
States (OAS) adopted the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention,
Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women (also known as
the Convention of Bel6m do Pard), which declared that violence against
women is any act or conduct, based on gender, which causes death or
physical, sexual, or psychological harm or suffering to women-whether
perpetrated by those in the public or the private spheres. 6 6 State Parties to
the Convention of Bel6m do Pard acknowledge that violence against

women is an offense against human dignity and a manifestation of the
unequal power relations that have historically existed between women and
men.67
Moreover, State Parties agree to pursue polices to prevent, punish, and
This includes a
eradicate such violence by all appropriate means.
commitment to adopting fair and effective legislation and procedures to

62. See id.

1.

63. Recommendation 1759 of the Parliamentary Assembly on Parliaments United
in Combating Domestic Violence Against Women arts. 4, 7.1 (2006) (adopted by the
Assembly on June 28, 2006, at the 20th sitting).
64. See Press Release, Terry Davis, Sec'y Gen., Council of Europe, Violence
Against Women: The Council of Europe Takes Its Campaign to a New Level (June 4,
2009), available at https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1428509.
65. Id.

66. See Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on the
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, Convention on
the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, "Convention
of Bel6m do Pard", arts. 1, 9 June 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534 [hereinafter Prevention,
Punishment, and Eradication].
67. See id. arts. 1, 5.
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address the various forms of gender-based violence.68 In particular, State
Parties commit to refrain from engaging in any act or practice of genderbased violence and to ensure that their authorities, officials, personnel,
agents, and institutions act in conformity with that obligation. 6 9 Finally,
State Parties also undertake to apply due diligence to prevent, investigate,
and impose penalties for acts of violence against women.70
II. THE DUE DILIGENCE STANDARD
Categorizing domestic violence as a human rights issue under
international law has important consequences. Acknowledging genderbased violence as a violation of human rights obliges member states to
prevent, investigate, and prosecute acts of violence against women." It
also requires that States should be held accountable if they fail to comply
with such commitments.72 As mentioned above, the traditional concept of
state responsibility has been understood under international law only in
relation to acts of violence against women that could be imputed to public
authorities." On the other hand, given the private nature of domestic
violence, such crimes have long been considered outside the government's
responsibility. 7 4
More recently, however, the concept of state accountability has been
expanded to include, not only state actions, but, more importantly,
omissions and failures in taking affirmative measures to adequately protect
women from violence.
Therefore, in addition to being directly

68. Id. art. 7.
69. Id.
70. Id.

71. See, e.g., id. art. 3 (discussing different ways State Parties are required to
"condemn ... prevent ... punish ... and eradicate" violence against women); Press
Release, Terry Davis, Sec'y Gen., Council of Europe, supra note 64 (stating that the
prevent, punish, and prosecute approach by the Council of Europe has become a
standard approach that countries can model their own framework to follow).
72. See, e.g., General Recommendation 12, supra note 32, 9 (explaining that
States are responsible for portraying due diligence in investigating and prosecuting
crimes of violence).
73. See Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 80/11, 118 (2011) (describing the State's responsibility to conform to principles
under the American Declaration).
74. See Thomas & Beasley, supra note 11, at 40-41 (stating that four factors have
led international human rights law to overlook domestic violence, including "(1)
traditional concepts of state responsibility under international law and practice; (2)
misconceptions about the nature and extent of domestic violence and states' responses
to it; (3) the neglect of equality before and equal protection of the law without regard to
sex as a governing human rights principle; and (4) the failure of states to recognize
their affirmative obligation to provide remedies for domestic violence crimes").
75. See General Recommendation 12, supra note 32, T 8, 9 (describing States'
responsibilities in failing to prevent domestic violence due to a lack of due diligence).
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accountable for acts of violence against women committed by their own
agents, states must also fulfill the obligation to prevent private individuals
from perpetrating gender-based violence.76 States are further required to
duly investigate and prosecute the perpetrators of violence against women,
and provide adequate remedies for victims. Therefore, a state can be held
accountable for domestic violence because "although the state does not
actually commit the primary abuse, its failure to prosecute the abuse
amounts to complicity in it."
The standard of due diligence that states are required to exercise in
investigating and prosecuting acts of violence against women was first
formulated in the aforementioned General Recommendation No. 19.71
Indeed, according to its provisions, Parties may be held responsible for
"private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of
rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing
compensation." 79 States' liability, therefore, should be construed on a caseby-case basis, through the criteria of reasonableness, based on the general
principles of non-discrimination and good faith.80 Thus, the standard of
due diligence requires State Parties to use any appropriate measures at their
disposal to address both individual acts of violence against women and
structural causes so as to prevent future violations and punish the
perpetrators.
Governments also have the duty to adopt and revise domestic legislation
for the protection of women, as well as to provide access to just and
effective remedies and specialized assistance to victims of violence. 82 A
"fundamental principle connected to the application of the due diligence
standard is that of non-discrimination, which implies that states are
required to use the same level of commitment in relation to prevention,
investigation, punishment and provision of remedies for violence against

76. See Thomas & Beasley, supra note 11, at 40-41 (stating that when a State fails
to prosecute an instance of domestic violence, they become a collaborator in
perpetuating the cycle of abuse).
77. Id.
9 (describing States'
78. See General Recommendation 19, supra note 22,
responsibility "for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations
of rights").
79. Id.
80. See U.N. Secretary-General, In-Depth Study on All Forms of Violence Against
Women, 257 U.N. Doc. A/61/122/Add. 1 (July 6, 2006) (discussing the standard of a
States' responsibility and deciding that the State would not be held responsible for all
violence against women, merely that which a good faith effort was not applied to
prevent and prosecute).
81. Id. 35.

82. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur, supra note 11, % 32, 38, 99 (describing Federal
and States' responsibilities through legislative action in response to domestic violence).
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women as they do with regards to other forms of violence."" In 1999, the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women developed
a list of considerations to assess State compliance with the obligation of
due diligence, including, inter alia:
ratification of international human rights instruments; constitutional
guarantees of equality for women; the existence of national legislation
and/or administrative sanctions providing adequate redress for women
victims of violence; policies or plans of action that deal with the issue of
violence against women; the gender-sensitivity of the criminal justice
system and police; accessibility and availability of support services [for
victims]; the existence of measures to raise awareness and modify
discriminatory policies in the field of education and the media, and the
collection of data and statistics concerning violence against women.84
Specific procedures to enhance state accountability for violence against
women are also contained in the Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Optional
Protocol).85 In force since December 22, 2000, the Optional Protocol
includes a complaint procedure, which allows victims to bring petitions or
complaints about violations of rights under CEDAW before the CEDAW
Committee. 8 6 The Optional Protocol also includes an inquiry procedure
that enables the CEDAW Committee to conduct inquiries into serious and
systematic abuses of women's human rights occurring within States that
Under the
are signatories to the Optional Protocol (State Parties).
complaints procedure of the Optional Protocol, the CEDAW Committee is
able to focus on individual cases and, thus, develop jurisprudence for any
particular matter. On the other hand, through the inquiry procedure the
CEDAW Committee can investigate substantial abuses when individual
communications and complaints have failed, address a broad range of
issues in a particular country, and issue specific recommendations on the
structural causes of violence.89
Only countries that have ratified the Optional Protocol are subject to the
CEDAW Committee's jurisdiction. It must be noted that to date, 187
83. Id. 35.
84. Id. 32.

85. See generally Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All

Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted Oct. 15, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83

(entered into force Dec. 22, 2000) [hereinafter Optional Protocol] (discussing the
procedures for victims wishing to submit allegations of perceived violations of their
rights).
86. See id. art. 8 1-3 (describing the inquiry and investigation process).
87. See id.

88. See id. art. 2 (providing a clause addressing victims submissions of violations).
89. See id. art. 7 (stating that the Committee is required to report back to interested
parties on its findings).
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countries have either ratified or acceded to CEDAW, which equates to over
ninety percent of the members of the United Nations. 90 However, only 79
countries assented to be parties to the Optional Protocol and to be bound by
its improved, additional enforcement mechanisms for women's human
rights.9 1 Exhaustion of all available domestic remedies is a necessary
condition for the admissibility of a communication. Additionally, in order
for a communication to be admissible, there must also not be another
international procedure of investigation or settlement underway on the
same complaint.92 When a communication has been found admissible, the
CEDAW Committee will bring it to the attention of the relevant State
Party, which has six months to provide a written response to the
allegation. 9 3 Subsequent to receipt of the written response by the State
Party, the CEDAW Committee examines all the information provided and
makes its recommendations available to the complainant and respondents
concerned.94 From that point, the State Party then has six months in which
to consider the views of the CEDAW Committee and to provide a written
response, including the remedies adopted.
Further inquiries and a confidential investigation may be initiated by the
CEDAW Committee in case it has received reliable information of grave or
systematic violations of established rights by the State Party. 96 With the
consent of the State Party, the CEDAW Committee may also visit the
territory of the state. 97 Any findings, comments, or recommendations will
then be transmitted to the State Party concerned, which has six months to
98
submit a written response to those findings or recommendations.
Similarly to the Optional Protocol, the Convention of Bel6m do Pard
provides specific procedures to improve state accountability for acts of
violence against women. Indeed, Article 12 allows individuals, groups of
persons, and non-governmental organizations to "lodge petitions with the
90. See Ratifications and Accessions to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13, at I (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
91. See id.

92. See Optional Protocol, supra note 85, art. 4 (stating that the Committee cannot
hear any allegations that have not exhausted all administrative remedies).
93. See id art. 6 (providing that the Committee bring the allegation to the attention
of the State confidentially).
94. Id. art. 7(1).
95. See id art. 7 (stating that the State Party is required to review the information
and make recommendations within six months).
96. See id. art. 8 (explaining that, if the Committee does find these violations, it
may invite the State to assist and cooperate in its investigation).
97. See id. (describing the investigatory procedures subsequent to the finding of a
violation).
98. Id.
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Inter-American Commission on Human Rights containing denunciations or
complaints of violations" of the rights and principles under the Convention
of Bel6m do Para by a State Party. 99
III. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS AND POSITIVE STATE OBLIGATIONS

An increasing body of jurisprudence concerning violence against women
has recently been produced by decisions of the CEDAW Committee under
the Optional Protocol as well as by relevant bodies within the European
and Inter-American human rights systems, constituting an important set of
precedents for the applicability of international law to state and individual
responsibility for practices of gender-based violence. 0 0 Following the
examples of international human rights monitoring bodies like the CEDAW
Committee, regional mechanisms are enhancing state accountability with
respect to domestic violence and producing relevant jurisprudence in the
field to serve as reference precedents for future cases. 0 1
For instance, in the A. T v. Hungary decision, the CEDAW Committee

remarked that the lack of specific legislation addressing domestic violence
itself constituted a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms for
women.1o2 In this case, the victim lamented that she had been subjected to
regular, severe domestic violence and death threats by her husband for four
years.10 3 She stated that she was not able to visit a shelter because no
shelter in Hungary was equipped to provide assistance to her and her two
children, one of whom was brain-damaged.104 She also denounced the fact
that no protection orders or restraining orders were available at the time
under Hungarian law.' 05
In response to her complaint, the CEDAW Committee expressed concern
for the lack of specific legislation and measures to combat domestic
99. Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication, supra note 66, art. 12.
100. See, e.g., A.T. v. Hungary, Comm. 2/2003, U.N. Doc. A/60/38, at 27 (2005)

(considering the communication made by a woman under the Optional Protocol);
Bevacqua v. Bulgaria, App. No. 71127/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008), available at
a
(reviewing
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/research/bulgaria/BEVACQUA.pdf
Bulgarian woman's claim of domestic abuse by her former husband); Lenahan v.
3 (2011)
United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 80/11,
(reviewing a petition against the United States Government alleging a failure to
"exercise due diligence [and] to protect [the woman] and her daughters from acts of
domestic violence perpetrated by the ex-husband" against whom the woman had a
restraining order).
101. See generally AT., U.N. Doc. A/60/38; Bevacqua, App. No. 71127/01;
Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11.
9.3 (holding that the State failed to fulfill its
102. See A. T., U.N. Doc. A/60/38,
obligations under the Convention).
103. Id. 2.1.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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violence in the country, including protection orders or exclusion orders and
shelters for victims.' 0 6 The CEDAW Committee declared that the State
Party's failure to comply with its obligations constituted a violation of the
victim's human rights and, particularly, her right to security of person.' 0 7
In its capacity as monitoring body of CEDAW, the CEDAW Committee
recommended that the State Party provide the victim and her family with
immediate and effective assistance, including a safe home, psychological
and legal support, as well as "reparation proportionate to the physical and
mental harm undergone and to the gravity of the violation of her rights." 08
The State Party admitted that domestic violence is a problem affecting
many Hungarian women, that the national legal system of remedies was
incomplete, and that the effectiveness of the existing procedures was not
sufficient.109 As a result of the A.T. v. Hungary decision and interactions
with the CEDAW Committee, the Hungarian Parliament adopted a
resolution on the national strategy for the prevention and effective
treatment of domestic violence, setting forth significant amendments to its
existing laws as well as other practical measures, including, in particular,
the introduction of restraining orders."10
Other decisions with respect to domestic violence issued by the CEDAW
Committee included the Goekce v. Austria'' and Yildirim v. Austria
cases.112 In the first case, the Vienna Intervention Centre Against Domestic
Violence and the Association for Women's Access to Justice lodged a
complaint on behalf of their client Goekce, who had been victim of
continued domestic violence and was eventually killed by her husband." 3
The State Party argued that the ambivalence of the victim toward her
husband's imprisonment and prosecution as well as her reluctance to end

106. See id 1 9.6 (making the recommendation that the State implement specific
legislation protecting women and children from domestic abuse).
107. See id. 1 9.3 (claiming that this violation of human rights was specifically due
to the lack of domestic violence and sexual harassment protections under Hungarian
law).
108.
109.
action
110.

Id. 9.6.
See id 5.7 (claiming that the State is instituting a comprehensive plan of
to combat domestic violence).
See id. (considering multiple remedial efforts to address the issue of domestic

violence).
111. See generally Goekce v. Austria, Comm. 5/2005, U.N. Doc. A/62/38, at 432

(2007).
112. See generally Yildirim v. Austria, Comm. 6/2005, U.N. Doc. C/39/D/6/2005
(2007).
113. See Goekce, U.N. Doc. A/62/38, T 2.1-11 (reiterating in the facts that the
victim's husband had threatened to kill her on multiple occasions, choked her, grabbed
her by her hair and pressed her face to the floor, and threatened to shoot her and her
family members).
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the relationship prevented the police from protecting her.11 4 In the second
case against Austria, the Vienna Intervention Centre Against Domestic
Violence and the Association for Women's Access to Justice submitted a
petition on behalf of Fatma Yildirim and her family." 5 The victim and her
children had been subject to repeated death threats, and she was eventually
murdered by her husband.1 6 In this case, in contrast to the Goekce case,
the deceased had been consistent in reporting the aggressions and asking
for the incarceration and prosecution of her husband."' However, the State
Party claimed that, since detention constitutes a massive interference with a
person's fundamental freedom, the decision of the police not to arrest her
husband was in accordance with a proportionality assessment of his lack of
criminal record and his cooperative behaviour with the police officers." 8
In both decisions, the CEDAW Committee reaffirmed that under
international law State Parties may be held accountable "for private acts if
they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to
investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing
compensation."ll 9 In both cases, the CEDAW Committee noted that the
State Party was in breach of its due diligence obligation to protect the
victims and promptly investigate and prosecute the offenders. 2 0 It also
expressed its general view that in domestic violence crimes "the
perpetrator's rights ... [to freedom of movement and to a fair trial] ...
cannot supersede women's human rights to life and to physical and mental
integrity."' 2 1 Therefore, the CEDAW Committee recommended that the
State Party strengthen the implementation and monitoring of its domestic
violence legislation, vigilantly and speedily prosecute perpetrators of
domestic violence, improve coordination between law enforcement and

114. See id.

4.11, 4.13 (stating that the woman refused consent to prosecute and

was unwilling to testify against her husband, playing down the incidents and denying
that they were criminal).
115. See Yildirim, U.N. Doc. C/39/D/6/2005, $ 2.1-14 (describing the events leading
up to the action, including numerous death threats to the woman and her children which
ultimately ended in her death).
116. Id
117. Compare Goekce, U.N. Doc. A/62/38, T 2.1-11 (characterizing the claimant's
actions here as "ambivalent where she did not consistently report the abuse or actively
pursue prosecution and incarceration of her husband), with Yildirim, U.N. Doc.
C/39/D/6/2005, T 2.1-14 (describing that the victim contacted the police on multiple
occasions and gave formal statements to pursue action against her abuser).
118. Yildirim, U.N. Doc. C/39/D/2005, 4.5.

119. Goekce, U.N. Doc. A/62/38, 12.1.1.
12.1.5 (utilizing the same language in Goekce and Yildirim in
120. See id
describing the failure to hold the woman's human rights at the same level as the
perpetrator's rights); see also Yildirim, U.N. Doc. C/39/D/2005, 12.1.5.
12.1.5; Yildirim, U.N. Doc. C/39/D/2005,
121. Goekce, U.N. Doc. A/62/38,
12.1.5.
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judicial officers, and strengthen training programs for law enforcement
officials. 122
Although the European human rights system has not yet adopted a
specific legally binding instrument on the protection of women against
gender-based violence, the European Court of Human Rights has issued
some of the most progressive decisions in relation to state accountability
for domestic violence. 12 3 For instance, in the case of Bevacqua v. Bulgaria,
the European Court of Human Rights found state responsibility for
domestic abuse suffered by the applicant and her son from her husband,
grounding its decision in Article 8 (the right to respect for private and
family life) of the European Convention. 124 The victim claimed that
Bulgaria had failed to assist her in prosecuting her husband, had treated
domestic violence as a trivial family matter, and had charged her with
abduction of her son when she sought refuge with him in a shelter for

abused women.' 2 5
In its decision, the European Court of Human Rights reaffirmed the
State's positive obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention,
which "may involve the adoption of measures in the sphere of the relations
of individuals between themselves," especially for the effective protection
of vulnerable people. 12 6 In conclusion, the Court found that the State
Party's failure to adopt custody measures against the victim's husband as
well as the lack of adequate sanctions by the authorities to prevent repeated
incidents of domestic violence amounted to a refusal to provide the
immediate assistance the applicants needed, and was contrary to the State's
positive obligations under Article 8 of the European Convention "to secure
respect for their private and family life." 27
In Kontrova v. Slovakia, the applicant filed a criminal complaint against
her husband after having suffered repeated psychological and physical
violence over the course of their relationship. 12 8 Although the local police
12.3 (providing recommendations to the
122. See Goekce, U.N. Doc. A/62/38,
State); see also Yildirim, U.N. Doc. C/39/D/2005, 12.3.
123. See, e.g., Bevacqua v. Bulgaria, App. No. 71127/01, Eur. Ct. H.R., 19 (2008),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/research/bulgaria/BEVACQUA.pdf
(holding the state responsible for domestic violence and ordering the state to pay
damages to the respondent).
124. See id. 84 (holding that the State's failure to respond effectively to the
complaints and the perpetrator's negative actions equates to a violation of her rights).
125. See id. 3, 63 (arguing that the courts also failed to rule in a timely manner).
126. Id. T 64.
127. See id 84 (holding the State in violation of positive obligations due to undue
delay and a failure to protect the well being of the victims by recognizing the behavior

of the perpetrator).

128. See Kontrovdi v. Slovakia, App. No. 7510/04, Eur. Ct. H.R.
8 (2007),
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/enIpages/search.aspx?i=00 1-80696
available
(included in this abuse was assault and beating with an electric cable as well as
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department was aware of this long history of abuse through reports and
emergency telephone calls made by the victim, they failed to investigate
the allegations and bring criminal charges. 12 9 Eventually, the applicant's
husband shot their two children and himself.13 0 The European Court of
Human Rights reaffirmed the State Party's positive obligation to take
appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their jurisdictions,
and their primary duty to secure the right to life by "putting in place
effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offenses
against the person."'
In particular, the Court noted that the Slovakian police had failed to
comply with a number of specific obligations, including accepting and
registering the applicant's complaint, initiating a criminal investigation and
action against the applicant's husband, keeping a proper record of the
emergency telephone calls made by the victim, and "taking action in
respect of the allegation that the applicant's husband had a shotgun and had
made violent threats with it." 32 In conclusion, the Court found that this
failure constituted violation of the right to life under Article 2 of the
European Convention. 133
Similarly, in Tomagid v. Croatia, the European Court of Human Rights
reaffirmed the State Party's positive obligation to take appropriate
measures to protect the right to life of the applicant and her daughter.' 34
The victim filed criminal complaints against her husband accusing him of
repeated death threats against her and their one-year old daughter.13 5
Following her report, the applicant's husband was arrested and a criminal
While in custody, he was
proceeding was initiated against him.'36
diagnosed with a "profound personality disorder."' 3 7 Upon his release from
prison, he murdered his wife and daughter and killed himself.3 s Following
its previous decision in Kontrov v. Slovakia, the Court reiterated that state
multiple previous abuses).
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See

3.
14.
49.
53.
55.
Tomagi

v. Croatia, App. No. 46598/06, Eur. Ct. H.R.,

50 (2009),

available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=002-1695 (holding
that these steps to safeguard the citizens' rights are primary and that the authorities
have "a positive obligation .

.

. to take preventive operational measures to protect an

individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual").
135. See id. 6 (reporting that the abuse had persisted over a span of six months).
136. See id. 17 (the investigation included a psychiatric evaluation).
137. .Id
138. See id. 10 (recounting that the husband had been out of prison for merely a
month when he committed the homicides).
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authorities have the positive obligation to take measures within the scope of
their power to prevent the "real and immediate risk to the life of an
identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party." 3 9 In
particular, the Court found that the Croatian authorities had "failed to order
and carry out a search of the premises and vehicle of the applicant's
husband" in the course of the investigation, and to adequately administer
his psychiatric treatment while he was in prison, thus failing to evaluate his
mental condition and to assess the risk for the lives of his wife and
daughter prior to his release.14 0
Finally, with the recent landmark decision of Opuz v. Turkey, the
European Court of Human Rights not only reiterated that states have
enforceable positive obligations to protect individuals from domestic abuse,
but it also held that domestic violence is a form of discrimination that
States are required to eradicate and remedy.141 In this case, the applicant,
Nahide Opuz, claimed that Turkey had failed to protect her and her mother
from acts of domestic violence perpetrated by the applicant's husband,
H.O., over a period of 12 years.14 2 The alleged incidents of violence
included physical assaults, death threats, and murder attempts.14 3
Eventually, H.O. shot and killed the applicant's mother.14 4 In her
complaint to the European Court, Nahide Opuz alleged that the Turkish
authorities had violated the right to life (Art. 2) with respect to the death of
her mother; the right to be free from torture, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment (Art. 3) with respect to the failure to protect the
applicant against domestic violence; and, finally, the right to nondiscrimination on the basis of sex (Art. 14).145
The Court found that there had indeed been a violation of the right to life
and held that the State has positive obligations to adopt "preventive
operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk." 4 6 In
light of such obligation, the Turkish authorities should have taken "special
139. Id. 51.
140. Id f 46,56,58.

141. See Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., 200 (2009), available
(holding the
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-92945
domestic abuse by the wife was gender-based violence, and thus a form of sex
discrimination against women).
142. See id. 3 (recounting that the alleged domestic violence eventually resulted in
the death of her mother and abuse to her).
143. See id. 9 (describing the abuse reported to the State's Prosecutor's Office).
144. See id 54 (stating that the husband shot the mother when she was attempting
to leave in a taxi cab).
145. See id. 118, 154, 177 (claiming the right to life in respect to the death of her
mother and the right to be free from torture in respect to the failure to protect the
applicant against domestic violence).
146. Id. 148.
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measures consonant with the gravity of the situation" in order to effectively
respond to the applicant's mother's repeated requests for protection. 147
Therefore, the European Court concluded that the national authorities had
not displayed due diligence and had "failed in their positive obligation to
protect the right to life of the applicant's mother under Article 2 of the
European Convention." 4 8
The Court also confirmed that there had been a violation of Article 3 of
the European Convention as a result of the authorities' failure to "take
measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are
not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
including ill treatment administered by private individuals." 4 9 It also
upheld the applicant's claim that the Turkish authorities' failure to exercise
sufficient due diligence to protect her from the ongoing violence made her
feel "hopeless and vulnerable" and as "though the violence had been
inflicted under state supervision.,15s
The Court recognized that there had been violation of the right to nondiscrimination on basis of sex as a result of the State's failure to implement
effective domestic violence legislation and to provide adequate protection
and remedies for the victims.' 5 ' It also noted that domestic abuse primarily
affected women and "that the general and discriminatory judicial passivity
in Turkey created a climate that was conducive to domestic violence."l5
Thus, the Court concluded that the "State's failure to protect women
against domestic violence breaches their right to equal protection of the
law" and enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the European
Convention in accordance with Article 14 thereof.15 3
As for domestic violence jurisprudence within the Inter-American
human rights system, in the case of Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v.
Brazil, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Commission)
declared that the State Party's failure to prosecute and punish a perpetrator
of domestic violence after more than 15 years of investigation "form[ed] a
pattern of discrimination evidenced by the condoning of domestic violence
against women in Brazil through ineffective judicial action."S 4 It also
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id. 149.
Id. 159.
Id. 155.

151. See id.
201 (dismissing the Government's objection to complainant's
allegation under Article 14 of the Convention by noting the lack of effective domestic
remedies).
152. Id.
153. Id.

198.
191.

154. Maria da Penha v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
54/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111 doc. 20 rev. 3 (2001).
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stated that the State Party's failure to protect the victim from the ongoing
violence contravened the member state's international commitments, and
eventually revealed its tolerance and complicity in the violence inflicted.' 55
Given the fact that the violence suffered by Maria da Penha was "part of
a general pattern of negligence and lack of effective action [by Brazilian
authorities] in prosecuting and convicting aggressors," the Commission
found that this case involved "not only failure to fulfil the obligation with
respect to prosecut[ion] and convict[ion], but also the obligation to prevent
these degrading practices.,l 5 6
Therefore, the Commission also
characterised gender-based violence as a form of discrimination by virtue
of the State Party's failure to exercise due diligence to prevent and
investigate a domestic violence complaint.
More recently, the Commission issued its landmark decision in Jessica
Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, holding that the United States of

America was in violation of the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man due to its failure to protect a victim of domestic
violence and her children.' 57 In this case, the American Civil Liberties
Union filed a petition on behalf of their client, Jessica Lenahan, and her
three deceased daughters. 58 The petitioners claimed that the United States
had failed to "exercise due diligence" in protecting Jessica Lenahan and her
daughters from acts of domestic violence perpetrated by her former
husband.15 9 They also argued that the public authorities in the state of
Colorado had dismissed Ms. Lenahan's telephone calls reporting that her
husband had abducted their three daughters, Rebecca, Katheryn, and Leslie,
in violation of a domestic violence restraining order against him.16 0
Eventually, Ms. Lenahan's husband arrived at the police station and began
shooting.' 6 ' The police officers retumed fire, killing him.16 2 The bodies of
Ms. Lenahan's three daughters were later found shot to death in their
father's truck. 6 1
In its decision, the Commission found that the United States had failed to
155. See id. 1 21, 60(4) (holding that the violation was a result of the government's
own failure to act).
156. Id. $ 56.
157. See Lenahan v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 80/11,
199 (2011) (listing multiple violations and failures of affirmative
responsibilities of the State).
158. Id. 1.
159. See id
2 (reiterating that the mother held a restraining order against the
father).
160. See id. (stating that the lack of enforcement of the restraining order ultimately
ended in the children's deaths).
161. Id. 32.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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exercise due diligence "to protect the victims from domestic violence by
adequately and effectively implementing the restraining order at issue."1 64
It held that the current domestic violence legislation and policies are
inadequate to protect women from domestic abuse, and thus encouraged the
State Party to adopt a relevant comprehensive reform at the local, state, and
federal levels.165 Moreover, the Commission held that the state's failure to
offer a coordinated and effective response to the victims' needs constituted
an act of discrimination, a breach of its affirmative obligation to protect
individuals from discriminatory violence, and a violation of their right to
equality before the law under Article II of the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man.' 66 Finally, the Commission found that the
United States' failure to take reasonable measures to protect the life of Ms.
Lenahan's daughters constituted a violation of their right to life established
in Article I of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Men,
in relation to their right to special protection contained in Article VII
thereof.167
CONCLUSION

From the analysis of the jurisprudence on domestic violence produced by
international human rights bodies, including the CEDAW Committee, the
European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, this article shows that, under international law, states are
now clearly accountable for acts of gender-based violence, whether those
acts are perpetrated by public authorities or by private individuals. 16In
particular, the recent decisions of Opuz v. Turkey and Jessica Lenahan
(Gonzales) v. United States by the European Court of Human Rights and

the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, respectively, represent
the most recent judicial developments in relation to domestic violence and
state responsibility.169 These decisions solidify the principle that domestic
164. Id. 1160.
165. See id. 201 (recommending that said legislation "mak[e] mandatory the
enforcement of protection orders and other precautionary measures to protect women
from imminent acts of violence, and to create effective implementation mechanisms").
166. Id. 1 160; see American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Res.
XXX Final Act, Ninth Conference of American States, art. II (1948) [hereinafter
American Declaration] (stating the principle of universal equality under the law).
170; see also American
167. Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11,
Declaration, supra note 166, arts. I, VII (reciting the principles of the right to life under
Article I and the right of all women to special protection under Article VII).
168. See, e.g., Goekce v. Austria, Comm. 5/2005, U.N. Doc. A/62/38, 1 12.1.1
(2007) (commenting that states bear responsibility for the actions of private
individuals).
169. See Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, Eur. Ct. H.R., TT 73, 148 (2009),
available
at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-92945
(reiterating that states have a responsibility to affirmatively protect women from
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violence is a violation of international law, and that States are liable for
ensuring that they exercise due diligence in preventing and protecting
women from this form of personal harm.' 70

discrimination under international law); Lenahan, Case 12.626, Report No. 80/11 1 126
(noting that a state incurs "international responsibility" for failing to protect women
from domestic violence).
170. See id.

